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II.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Order that is the subject of this appeal is a final order
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. The Utah
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
Section 3 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1990).
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

Did The District Court Err In Concluding, As A Matter Of

Law, That Defendant First Security's Operating Procedures Manual
And Its Promises Of Continued Employment Did Not Create An Enforceable

Implied-In-Fact

Contract?

The review of this question

presents for review only questions of law; the standard of review
is correction-of-error, and the district court's conclusions are
entitled to no deference. See, Madsen v. United Television, Inc.,
131 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc.,
772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989).
B.

Did The District Court Err In Its Conclusion That

Defendant First Security Effectively Disclaimed The Implied-In-Fact
Contract Created By Its Operating Procedures Manual?

This issue

involves only principles of law; the district court's view of the
law is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, and is
entitled to no deference. See, Madsen v. United Television, Inc.,

1

131 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc.,
772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989).
C.

Did The District Court Err In Ordering, As A Matter Of

Law, That Plaintiff Sanderson Could Not Recover For Emotional
Distress

As

Foreseeable

Consequential

Damages

Arising

From

Defendant First Security's Contractual Breach Of Its Employment
Contract With Plaintiff?

This issue involves only principles of

law; the district court's view of the law is reviewed under a
correction-of-error standard, and is entitled to no reference.
See, Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 131 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990);
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah
1989).
D.

Did The District Court Err In Implicitly Concluding That

The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Does Not Exist
In Utah Employment Contracts?

This issue involves only principles

of law; the district court's view of the law is reviewed under a
correction-of-error standard, and is entitled to no deference.
See, Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 131 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990);
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969

Jtah

1989) .
E.

Did The District Court Err In Permitting

afendant I :st

Security To File Plaintiff Sanderson's Deposition So As To Bet me
Part Of The Record Cn Appeal, Even Though The District Court
2

Reviewed Only Certain Deposition Pages Attached To Plaintiff
Sanderson's Pleadings? This issue involves only principles of law;
the

district

court's

view

of

the

law

is

reviewed

under a

correction-of-error standard, and is entitled to no deference.
See, Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 131 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990);
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah
1989).
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff/Appellant
instituted

his

Defendant/Appellee
Security") on
Complaint.

Russell

wrongful
First

September

W.

Sanderson

termination

Security

Leasing

28, 1989, when

("Sanderson")

action

against

Company

("First

Sanderson

filed his

In that Complaint, Sanderson sought contract damages,

including consequential damages, resulting from his termination by
First Security.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On February 20, 1990, First Security filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 49-50), and requested oral argument.
96).

(R. 95-

After being fully briefed by the parties (R. 51-90, 116-206,

217-55), the district court conducted a hearing on First Security's
motion on March 23, 1990.

(R. 258).

3

After that hearing took place, First Security applied to che
district court for an order allowing the filing of Sanderson's
deposition, even though the district court did not have that
deposition before it when considering First Security's motion.
(R. 259-60).

Sanderson

opposed

that

motion

(R.

263-67);

nonetheless the district court granted the application without a
hearing (R. 261, 279-80).
Finally,

on

April

9,

1990,

First

Security

served

on

Sanderson's counsel its proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment (R. 287); on April 12, 1990, Sanderson served
his objection to that proposed Order.
C.

(R. 290).

DISPOSITION AT DISTRICT COURT

On March 28, 1990, the district court entered an order
permitting the entire Sanderson deposition to be filed.
After

considering

district

court

Sanderson's

issued

objections

a Minute

to

that

(R. 261).

order, the

Entry explaining why

permitting Sanderson's deposition to be filed.

it was

A copy of that

Minute Entry is included herein as Addendum "A".

On April 11,

1990, the district court entered Summary Judgment in favor of First
Security, and also entered its Order Granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, (R. 282-83, 285-86).

A copy of the district

court's Order granting summary judgment is included herein as
Addendum "B".
4

On May 10, 1990, Sanderson timely filed his Notice of Appeal.
(R. 305-06).
V.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

From the time of his hiring in 1980, until the time First
Security

terminated

him,1

Sanderson

was

given

increasingly

responsible positions with First Security, and received sizeable
salary increases.2
Until May 1983, First Security employed Sanderson as a Leasing
Officer II (R. 198). He was then promoted to Leasing Officer I and
assistant vice president, a position he held until June 1984 when
he was again promoted to an "unclassified-exempt" (from overtime)
status.

(R. 198).

Finally, in August 1985 Sanderson was named

vice president and manager of First Security's Equipment Services
Department, and a member of First Security's Senior Management
Committee.

(R. 18, 198).

1

Throughout this action, Sanderson has claimed he was
involuntarily terminated (R. 2, 171); First Security contends
Sanderson quit (R. 20, 171). It is obvious that the question of
whether Sanderson quit or was terminated is a question of fact,
inappropriate for summary judgment. Accordingly, the district
court did not and could not address this issue in its ruling.
Rather, the district court merely ruled as a matter of law that
First Security had not modified Sanderson's at-will employment
status.
2

Sanderson received 8% raises in 1986, 1987, and 1988.
(R. 131, 198). During the same time, his performance rating
increased from 5.8 to 6.2 out of a possible 7. (R. 131, 198).
5

Until December 1988, Sanderson was responsible for both the
Account

Services

and

Equipment

Services

Departments.

As

Sanderson's responsibilities grew he did not have time to manage
both departments. Accordingly, on December 6, 1988, First Security
assigned the Account Services Department to another employee so
that Sanderson could "devote 100% of his time in developing the
Equipment Services Department,"

(R. 143-44, 150).

In explaining this change, Sanderson's superior attested that
Sanderson had "done an excellent job in managing both areas, but
with this added responsibility and challenge, it is not fair to
spread his talents so thin."

(R. 143-44, 150). At the time of

this change, Sanderson was given an 8% salary increase —
$46,069.92 per year —

to

and was given a performance rating of 6.2

out of a possible seven points (R. 131, 198). This was the highest
rating Sanderson had earned in the past three years.

(R. 131,

198).
During this period of Sanderson's employment, and since at
least 1982, First Security had in effect an Operating Procedures
Manual (the "Manual") consisting of 145 pages, which governed,
among other things, the procedures to be followed when disciplining
and discharging employees. OP 6-5.2 of the Manual — the procedure
central to Sanderson's claims — provides:

6

POLICY
1.
First Security follows the Managing for
Improvement Procedure as a guideline for
disciplinary action taken by management for
all First Security Employees (officer/nonofficer) .
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY
IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE,

THE

MANAGING

FOR

2.
The Managing for Improvement Procedure is
used to deal with two distinct types of
disciplinary problems.
(a) Job Performance; Repeated failure
to meet performance standards.
(b)

Policy Violation:

(1) Repeated violations of
First Security work rules/policy.
(2) A
single,
serious
violation of work rules/policy.
DOCUMENTING
PROCEDURE.

THE

MANAGING

FOR

IMPROVEMENT

3.
Documentation is described in detail in
Volume V of the Personnel Communication
Series, Employment Practices.
(a) Documentation at the informal stage
is not retained in the Employee Personnel
File.
(b) Documentation at the formal state is
retained in the Employee Personnel File.
MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE.
4.
(a) Informal Stage — The informal stage
is used to address initial job performance/
policy violation problems.
7

(1) Discuss the situation with the
employee.
Listen to the employee and
work together to determine causes for
apparent problems.
(2) If a job performance problem
exists, determine if the employee has had
sufficient training.
(3) If a policy violation has
occurred, determine if the employee
understands work rules/policy.
(4) Discuss appropriate behavior
with the employee. Make sure that the
employee understands what is expected and
the consequences for repeated violation.
(b) Formal Stage — The formal stage is
used to rectify job performance/policy
violation problems which have not been
resolved at the informal stage. Use of
the formal stage is also appropriate if
the employee falls into a pattern of
repeated violation after showing a short
term change in behavior as a result of
involvement in the informal stage.
(1)

Job Performance Problems:
(A) When informal action is
ineffective, prepare a plan for
improvement with the employee.
Describe the behavioral change
required, time frame allotted
for
improvement,
and
consequences resulting from
failure to improve, which may
include probation, suspension,
or salary review.
(B) If the employee does not
improve performance within the
allotted time frame, place the
employee on probation for a
8

period of time not to exceed
ninety (90) days.
(C) If the employee does not
improve performance during the
probationary period, terminate
the employee in accordance with
bank/subsidiary policy.
(2) Policy Violation Problems:
(A) Prepare a written warning
for the employee when informal
discussion
of
a
policy
violation has been ineffective.
Include a record of events,
behavior that violated the work
rule/policy,
and
the
consequences resulting from
repeated violation.
(B) If violations continue
after
a
written
warning,
suspend the employee for a
period of one to three days
without pay.
(C) If violations occur after
the suspension, terminate the
employee.
TERMINATION GUIDELINES
5.
Suspension/terminations resulting from
this procedure are to be approved by the
Division/Subsidiary Head Office.
6.
In situations where employee behavior
warrants immediate termination the stages of
this proces do not need to be followed.
Termination in these cases must be approved by
the appropriate
Division/Subsidiary
Head
Office.

9

COMPENSATION GUIDELINES
7.
Employees involved in the formal stage of
the procedure are not eligible for job
announcements (where applicable), and salary
increases.
(R. 139-141).3
The Manual accordingly sets forth mandatory procedures to be
followed by First Security in terminating its employees.

In

particular, Policy No. OP 6-5.2 provides that First Security must
adhere to a program of progressive discipline before terminating
an employee for reasons other than for cause.4

Where terminating

its employees, other than for cause, the Manual requires First
Security to give the employee written warnings, to develop plans
for improvement with the employee, and to put the employee on
probation or suspension before termination.

3

The actual pages from the Manual containing OP 6-5.2 are
included herein as Addendum "C".
4

First Security also claims, inconsistently with its claim
that Sanderson quit, that it terminated Sanderson "for cause."
(R. 58, 218, 223). Again, the issue of whether Sanderson was
terminated for cause or other than for cause is a question of fact,
not a question of law, and was not, and could not have been,
addressed by the district court in its resolution of First
Security's summary judgment motion. See, e.g. , Swanson v. Liquid
Air Corp., 55 Wash. App. 917, 781 P.2d 900, 903 (App. 1989); Jones
v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp. 779 P.2d 783, 789 (Alaska 1989);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880, 895 (1980).
10

During his tenure as a First Security supervisor and manager,
Sanderson was given numerous copies of the Manual, told to follow
the Manual, observed First Security following OP 6-5.2 in terminating employees, and did in fact use the Manual and the procedures
contained in it when disciplining and terminating an employee.
(R. 183-85, 189-90).

At no time before First Security terminated

Sanderson, however, did he receive any written plan for improvement, nor was he ever put on probation or suspended as required by
the Manual.

(R. 20, 145-46).

The Manual nowhere contains any disclaimer making clear the
mandatory procedures required by the Manual are discretionary, not
binding on First Security, or otherwise illusory, or that First
Security claims the right to ignore the Manual as it sees fit.
Two employee handbooks —

entirely separate documents from the

Manual — contain language purporting to preserve First Security's
alleged right to terminate employees such as Sanderson without
cause and for no reason, i.e. at First Security's will.

(R. 81,

84, 236). Those purported disclaimers are, however, in the same
typeface as all the other provisions in those handbooks, are
inconspicuously buried among other provisions rather than being
prominently displayed, contain no highlighting, borders or other
signals calling an employee's attention to those provisions, and
make no reference whatever to the Manual.
11

(R. 81, 84, 236).

First Security manifested its commitment to OP 6-5.2 —
employee termination procedure in the Manual —

~he

in numerous ways.

The language used in the Manual is mandatory.

First Security

provided Sanderson with several copies of the Manual containing OP
6-5.2.

(R. 183). Sanderson was directed to follow OP 6-5.2, and

did in fact follow it in terminating a subordinate employee.
(R. 189-90, 196-97).

Sanderson observed other First Security

supervisors follow the procedures in OP 6-5.2 when terminating
employees.

(R. 184-85, 189, 196).

First Security even gave

Sanderson a copy of OP 6-5.2 at the time of his exit interview
(R. 183).
It was against this background that Sanderson approached C.S.
"Bud" Cummings ("Cummings"), Sanderson's direct supervisor, when,
during 1988 and 1989, Sanderson experienced physical and emotional
difficulties which kept him away from work, and, in some cases
required

his

hospitalization.

Sanderson

was

approximately five or six times during this period.

hospitalized
(R. 162-63,

167) . Sanderson's doctors encountered difficulty in diagnosing the
source of Sanderson's illness.

(R. 162-63, 167).

During the period of these difficulties and hospitalizations,
Sanderson and Cummings had several conversations about Sanderson's
health and the effect it

is having on Sanderson'b job attendance.

Cumminas repeatedly told Sanderson not to worry and to take all the
12

time he needed to regain his health. He assured Sanderson that his
existing job would be retained for him during his illness and
recovery.

(R. 181-82, 186).

On approximately April 3, 1989, Gary Judd ("Judd") was given
the responsibility of managing the Equipment Services Department
during Sanderson's illness.

(R. 242).

Based on past events,

Sanderson believed that Judd was "out to get" Sanderson

(R. 171).

Shortly

he

after

Judd

assumed

this

responsibility,

criticizing Sanderson's performance in written memos.
249-55).

began

(R. 242-48,

Significantly, however, none of those memos was directed

to Cummings, Sanderson's supervisor.

(R. 242, 249).

Three days before First Security terminated Sanderson, Judd
called Rob Garff ("Garff"), a social worker treating Sanderson
under the supervision of Sanderson's psychiatrist. Garff told Judd
that Sanderson was under stress and emotional upset, and would need
at least two weeks leave of absence from work.

(R. 204-06).

Judd

professed concern to Garff that whatever First Security did "might
cause an adverse reaction" in Sanderson.

(R. 206). Garff replied

that Sanderson needed "a little time . . .
control."

(R. 206).

to get himself under

Garff recommended, in conclusion, that

Sanderson be given a short leave of absence, perhaps two weeks

13

(R. 206).5

Instead of accept aq that recommendation, and with full

knowledge of the consequences of terminating Sanderson, First
Security terminated Sanderson when he declined to accept a demotion
to an undefined job.

(R. 131-32, 134).

On May 15, 1989 Cummings and Judd advised Sanderson that First
Security would terminate Sanderson's employment without notice or
warning unless Sanderson accepted a demotion to another unspecified
position, at a greatly reduced salary.

(R. 168, 172-73).

First

Security never told Sanderson what job he would be demoted to.
(R. 168-73, 194-95).

When Sanderson declined to accept this

unspecified job, First Security terminated him.

(R. 131-32, 134).

First Security's own records identify Sanderson's termination as
involuntary

(R. 131-32, 134).

Moreover, First Security paid

Sanderson severance pay, a benefit specifically denied by the
Manual to employees who quit or who are terminated for "cause"
(R. 191-94,

200).

First

Security's

own

documents

therefore

establish that Sanderson was terminated for reasons other than for
"cause," and that First Security was obliged to follow OP 6-5.2.
Nevertheless, First Security ignored all the procedures published
in the Manual at OP 6-5.2.

Judd's memorandum of that conversation, along with a
verbatim transcription, is included herein as Addendum "D".
14

VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Based on the undisputed record in this case, this Court should
reverse the district court's summary judgment and remand this case,
directing the district court to enter judgment finding First
Security liable to Sanderson, and directing the district court to
conduct a trial solely on the issue of Sanderson's damages.
At the least, however, the reasonability of Sanderson's
reliance requires the district court's summary judgment to be
reversed, and a trial held on Sanderson's claims that First
Security's Manual and Cummings' oral assurances created a binding
implied-in-fact contract between First Security and Sanderson.
At that trial, Sanderson is entitled to present evidence
concerning the emotional distress he suffered as a result of First
Security's contract breach, and that this emotional distress was
foreseeable to First Security.

In addition, Sanderson is entitled

to present evidence concerning First Security's breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In considering

this

appeal, this

Court

should

make no

reference to Sanderson's November 7, 1989 deposition (R. 311) in
its deliberations for the reason that the district court did not
have that deposition before it at the time it granted First
Security's motion for summary judgment.

15

VII.

ARGUMENT

This appeal arises from the district court's grant of summary
judgment.

In appellate review of summary judgments, the implicit

standard of review is whether the district court erred "as a matter
of law."

See, Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 142

U.A.R. 7, 15 n. 5 (1990).

Because summary judgment is granted as

a matter of lawf the appellate court is free to reappraise the
district court's legal conclusions.

See, e.g., Atlas Corp. v.

Clovis Nat'l. Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).

In conducting

its reviewf the appellate court affords the district court's legal
conclusions no deference; they are reviewed de novo.

See, e.g.,

Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomcruist, 773 P.2d
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).

In reviewing a district court's grant of

summary judgment, this Court views the facts and inferences to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party.
See e^q., Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 139 U.A.R. 3, 4 (1990).
In its pleadings before the district court, First Security
asserted the contradictory, but equally self-serving, positions
that Sanderson (1) quit, and (2) was involuntarily terminated for
cause.

(R. 20, 58, 171, 218, 233). First Security's own documents

belie both these assertions. Rather, the relevant documents fully
support Sanderson's claim that he was involuntarily terminated for
alleged "unsatisfactory performance" without first being afforded
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the protections the Manual and Cummings, his supervisor, promised
him.
To the extent the exact nature of Sanderson's severance from
First Security is at issue, First Security's summary judgment
motion should never have been granted.

District courts are

prohibited from resolving disputed issues of material fact in the
context of summary judgments. See, e.g.. Hardy v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Amer., 763 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah 1988).

To the extent there

is any dispute surrounding the nature of Sanderson's termination,
therefore it must be resolved in the light most favorable to
Sanderson.
First

See e.g., Projects Unlimited, 142 U.A.R.
Security's

own

records

establish,

at p. 8.

however,

that

Sanderson was terminated for alleged "unsatisfactory performance."
(R. 131-134).

Sanderson's claim pursuant to First Security's

Operating Procedures is simply that First Security fired him
without observing its own mandatory discipline and termination
procedures, and that he is entitled to damages resulting from First
Security's breach of their implied-in-fact contract.
By publishing and following these procedures, First Security
knew or should have known all its employees would rely on the
Manual's assurances. Thus, an implied-in-fact contract was created
rebutting the employment-at-will presumption.
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First Security's

failure

to

observe

its

own

procedures

accordingly

provides

Sanderson with an action for wrongful discharge.
A.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Manual

And Cummings' Promises of Continued Employment Did Not Create An
Enforceable Implied-in-fact Contract.

The landmark Utah case

establishing that employee handbooks give rise to binding impliedin-fact employment contracts was Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.,
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).

In Berube, defendant employer had a

policy of terminating employees without prior warning only for a
few specific reasons, including the refusal to take a polygraph
test.

In all other situations, however, the employer indicated

that termination would occur only when the employee was properly
warned and given a reasonable opportunity to improve performance.
As has First Security, the employer had issued a policy providing
for extensive warning procedures in order to give the employee time
to improve. See, id. at 1047. The employer ignored its own policy
and terminated the employee for her refusal to take a third
polygraph test.

After a jury trial, the employer was found not

liable to the employee, and she appealed.
On appeal, this Court reversed the jury verdict and ordered
a new trial in which the jury would determine whether an impliedin-fact contract was created by the employer's policy.

See, id.

at 1044, 1052. In that case, this Court found that the employment18

at-will doctrine is merely a presumption which may be rebutted by
evidence demonstrating an implied-in-fact contract existed.
The Berube plurality explained why employee manuals are
implied-in-fact contracts:
An employee may demonstrate that his at-will termination
breached an express or implied agreement with the
employer to terminate him for cause alone . • . Such
evidence may be found in employment manuals, oral
agreements, and all circumstances of the relationship
which demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause
or to continue employment for a specific period. . . .
Id. at 1044 (citations omitted).
Justice Zimmerman, concurring in the result, elaborated:
Because the at will doctrine is only a presumption, the
presumption can be rebutted by demonstrating that the
parties did not intend the arrangement to be at will.
In this context, the representations made by the employer
and employee manuals, bulletins and the like are
legitimate sources
for determining
the apparent
intentions of the parties.
Id. at 1052 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
This specific holding was foreshadowed by an earlier case,
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah
1981).

There, plaintiff counselor sued defendant college for

wrongful discharge because the college failed to follow its own
published termination procedure, which was functionally identical
to the termination procedure adopted by First Security in its
Manual.
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Prior to his discharge, the counselor had a series of one-year
employment

contracts

with

the

college.

Midway

through

the

counselor's final year, the college advised him his contract would
not be renewed.

The counselor sued the college, arguing the non-

renewal violated his rights as set forth in the college's personnel
manual.

The college argued that because the counselor's contract

expired by its own terms, the counselor was not dismissed at all,
but simply not rehired.

See, Id.

In affirming the district court's verdict for the counselor,
this

Court

established

that

contractual

obligation

to

an

employer

observe

may

particular

"undertake

a

termination

formalities by adopting procedures or by promulgating rules and
regulations governing the employment relationship."

Ld. at 1066.

The first Utah employee handbook and termination procedure
case after Berube was Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc.,
777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989).

In Caldwell, defendant's employer had

a policy of not discharging employees for cause unless and until
three steps had been followed. The employer also had a policy that
no notice would be given to employees terminated for reasons other
than cause.

In finding that the employee was terminated for

reasons other than cause, and therefore not entitled to expect the
puDlished procedures, Justice Zimmerman synthesized the plurality
and concurring Berube opinions:
20

[A]n employer's
internally adopted policies and
procedures concerning discharge can be sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption of at-will employment
and can, in effect, become part of the contractual
relationship between the employer and the employee.
Id. at 485.
This Court again considered employee manuals and termination
procedure issues in Arnold v. Titan Servs. Co., 783 P.2d 541 (Utah
1989).

There

procedures

for

the

employer's

disciplining

operating

and

manual

terminating

employees

generally correspond to First Security's OP 6-5.2.
542-43.

The employer

terminating the employee.

failed to

established
that

See, Id. at

follow those procedures

in

Nevertheless, after a bench trial, the

court dismissed the employee's complaint.
In reversing the district court, this Court set forth a threepart burden a plaintiff must meet in proving his discharge was
wrongful under an implied-in-fact contract created by an employee
manual:

(1) that the termination is made without adherence to the

procedures set out in an operating manual; (2) that the discharge
violated the procedures set out in the operating manual; and (3)
that there was no justification for not following the procedures.
See, Id. at 544.

Because the employee had satisfied those three

elements, this Court reversed and remanded, not for a retrial, but
solely for the determination of damages.
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See, id.

In this case, Sanderson has satisfied all the elements.
Sanderson

was

involuntarily

terminated.

(R.

131-32, 134).

Sanderson was never given a written plan for improvement, was never
placed on probation, and was never suspended.
46).

See, (R. 20, 145-

Sanderson's consistent salary increases and exceptional

performance ratings demonstrate First Security had no sufficient
justification for ignoring its published Manual.

First Security

provides no justification for not following its own procedures.
OP 6-5.2 applied to Sanderson's employment relationship with First
Security, and First Security admittedly failed to follow it in
terminating Sanderson for alleged "unsatisfactory performance."
Accordingly, the district court's

summary

judgment should be

reversed, and this matter should, as in Titan Services, be remanded
solely for the determination of Sanderson's damages.
At the least, however, First Security's claimed justification
presents a material factual —
district

court's

summary

not a legal —

judgment

to

be

issue, requiring the
reversed.

Berube

established that the question of whether an employment manual
creates an implied-in-fact contract is inappropriate for summary
judgment, but must instead be decided by the jury:
[T]he determination of whether sufficient indicia of an
implied-in-fact promise exists is a question of fact for
the jury, with the burden of proof residing upon the
plaintiff-employee.
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Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044 (plurality opinion).

See also. Id. at

1052 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
OP 6-5.2 requires that employees terminated other than for
cause must first receive formal progressive discipline.

(R. 139-

41) . Sanderson was involuntarily terminated for reasons other than
"cause."

(R. 134). While First Security does not pay severance

pay if an employee quits or is fired for cause, (R. 200), Sanderson
received

severance

(R. 191-94).

pay

when

First

Security

terminated

him.

First Security never prepared a written plan for

improvement in consultation with Sanderson, never placed him on
formal probation and never suspended him, each of which was a
necessary step before terminating a First Security employee for
reasons other than "cause."

(R. 140).

In light of the holdings of the above decisions, and the
undisputed and disputed material facts in this case, the district
court erred in granting summary judgment.

The district court

further erred in treating Sanderson's claims as if they presented
only legal issues. There is a fundamental and material factual
question that the district court could not resolve in connection
with a summary judgment motion adverse to Sanderson: was First
Security justified in ignoring its own procedures?
It was similarly erroneous for the district court to rule
there was no factual question concerning the oral representations
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made by Cummings. As pointed out in the Berube plurality, the test
is whether an employer's actions were inconsistent with an exemployee's objectively reasonable expectation.

See, Berube 771

P.2d at 1048.
Sanderson

contends

Cummings

assured

Sanderson

that

his

existing job would still be available to him whenever he overcame
his health problems.

(R. 181-82, 186). First Security disagrees.

Berube establishes that the question of whether such employer
promises create a contract is a question for the jury.
Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044-45, 1048, 1052.

See,

The issue in Utah is

whether Sanderson's expectations were "objectively reasonable."
Questions of objective reasonability in wrongful discharge cases
such as this are for the jury. See, e.g. , Stark v. Circle K Corp.,
230 Mont. 468, 751 P.2d 162, 166 (1988).
Another

way

of

framing

the

same

question

Sanderson's reliance on OP 6-5.2 and on Cummings' —
supervisor
justified.

—

oral

assurances

of

continued

is

whether

his direct

employment

was

Here again the question of whether an employee's

reliance on such promises is reasonable is a question of fact for
the jury.

See, e.g., Siekawitch v. Washington Beef Producers, 58

Wash. App. 454, 793 P.2d 994, 998 (App. 1990).
The indicia of a legally sufficient implied-in-fact contract,
the objective reasonability of Sanderson's expectations, and the
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justifiability of this reliance were all questions of fact for the
jury. The district court erred in granting First Security's Motion
for Summary Judgment, and this Court should now reverse the
district court and remand for a trial on the merits.
B.
Security

The

District

Effectively

Court

Erred

Disclaimed

The

In Concluding

That First

Implied-in-fact

Contract

Created By The Manual. First Security did not, and under Utah case
law could not, disclaim its mandatory procedures.

The Manual

itself contained no disclaimer or other indication its mandatory
procedures were discretionary or illusory. Rather, First Security
argued, and the district court agreed, that purported disclaimers
in two separate and unrelated documents were legally sufficient to
disclaim the binding implied-in-fact contract that Sanderson claims
OP 6-5.2 created.

As a matter of law, First Security's purported

disclaimer is ineffective and meaningless.
Berube explicitly held that employee manuals such as First
Security's create binding implied-in-fact contracts. No Utah case
has even suggested those contracts can be "disclaimed."

In fact,

to allow such a result would totally undermine the entire rationale
of Berube that operating procedures such as OP 6-5.2 become "part
of the contractual relationship between the employer and the
employee."

Caldwell, 777 P.2d at p. 485.
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An employer such as First Security cannot, by language or by
its actions, encourage reliance on a policy, and then be free to
only enforce it selectively.

"Having announced a policy, the

employer may not treat it as illusory*"

Leikvold v. Valley View

Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170, 174 (1980).
In

applying

Leikvold,

the

Alaska

"Employers should not be allowed to

Supreme

Court

wrote:

v

instill . . . reasonable

expectations of job security' in employees, and then withdraw the
basis for those expectations when the employee's performance is no
longer desired."

Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d

783, 788 (Alaska 1989) (quoting, Leikvold, 688 P.2d at 174).
In Jones plaintiff nurse argued that a personnel policy manual
issued by her employer, a hospital, and its parent modified the
terms of the nurse's at-will employment.

The hospital argued the

manual did not rebut the employment-at-will presumption because,
inter alia, it contained a purported disclaimer. See, id. at 787.
The trial court entered summary judgment for the hospital and its
parent, and the plaintiff appealed.

The Alaska court ruled, as

did this court in Berube, that employment manuals do become part
of the contract between an employee and her employer, and that
purported disclaimers do not prevent the formation of a contract.
Jones is particularly relevant to this case because there, the
employer had inserted an one-sentence disclaimer, followed by "85
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pages of detailed text covering policies, rules, regulations and
definitions."

The court found as a matter of law that the

purported disclaimer was not conspicuous.

Here, First Security's

145-page Manual does not even contain a disclaimer. Instead, First
Security relies on two short inconspicuous statements contained on
the sixth (R. 81), and fifth (R. 84) pages of totally separate
documents, which are not even referred to in OP 6-5.2.6
Jones

also

cited

extensively

a

landmark

Michigan case,

Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980) for propositions directly relevant to this case.
Toussaint has also been previously relied on by this Court in a
wrongful termination case. See, Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State
College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066 n. 5 (Utah 1981).
Toussaint was a consolidated appeal by two former middlemanagement employees of two different employers.

Both employees,

Toussaint and Ebling, inquired regarding job security when they
were hired.

Toussaint's employer told him he would be with the

company as long as he did his job; Ebling was told essentially the
same thing.

The Michigan Supreme Court held at the outset that

whether these oral representations alone constituted enforceable
promises constituted factual questions for the jury.

6

See, id. at

The two "disclaimers" relied on by First Security are
included herein as Addendum "E".
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p. 884.

In addition, Toussaint's employer provided him with a

personnel manual which provided that employees would be terminated
only for just cause.

In affirming the jury awards to both ex-

employees , the Toussaint court wrote:
While an employer need not establish personnel policies
or practices, where an employer chooses to establish such
policies and practices and makes them known to its
employees, the employment relationship is presumably
enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative
and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind
associated with job security and the conviction that he
will be treated fairly. No pre-employment negotiations
need take place and the parties' minds need not meet on
the subject; nor does it matter that the employee knows
nothing of the particulars of the employer's policies and
practices or that the employer may change them unilaterally. It is enough that the employer chooses, presumably
in its own interest, to create an environment in which
the employee believes that, whatever the personnel
policies and practices, they are established and official
at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied
consistently and uniformly to each employee.
The
employer has then created a situation "instinct with an
obligation."
Id. at 892 (footnotes omitted).
The Toussaint court further identified a benefit received by
employers which makes disclaimers particularly inappropriate in
employment contracts:
Having announced the policy, presumably with a view to
obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and
behavior and improved quality of the work force, an
employer may not treat its promise as illusory.
Id. at 895.
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This Court has already indicated that one acceptable form of
reliance —

if reliance is required at all —

is the use of the

procedures by a management employee with respect to employees under
his or her direct supervision.

See, Titan Services, 783 P.2d 541

at p. 542. Sanderson himself had followed OP 6-5.2 in terminating
an employee under his supervision.

(R. 184-85, 189, 197) , and

observed other First Security supervisors following OP 6-5.2 in
terminating covered employees.

(R. 184-85, 189, 196).

Even where other courts have allowed employers to disclaim the
implied-in-fact contracts created by their manuals, those courts
have required that, to be a legally effective disclaimer it must
"clearly and conspicuously" tell employees "that the manual is not
part

of

their

employment

contract

and

that

their

jobs

are

terminable at the will of the employer with or without reason."
Leikyold, 688 P.2d at 174 (1984).

No "disclaimer" relied on by

First Security indicates in any way that the Manual or OP 6-5.2 is
not part of the employment contract.
Leikvold

rule

that

disclaimers must be both (1) clear, and (2) conspicuous.

See

generally, M.

is but

one

example

Chagares, Utilization

of

the

general

of the Disclaimer as an

Effective Means to Define the Employment Relationship, 17 Hofstra
L. Rev. 365, 380 (1989).
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This same article details the requirements for a disclaimer
to be effective in the employment relationship:
Disclaimers, as a result of their great importance, must
be displayed prominently in communications to employees
in order to be effective. A conspicuous disclaimer is
one presented so that a reasonable person against whom
it would operate would notice it. Hence, a disclaimer
must be separated from or contrasted with the balance of
an employer's communication. Such a separation may be
achieved, for example, by using different type for the
disclaimer, such as bold, capitals or italics, by
underlining the disclaimer, or by printing or outlining
the disclaimer in a contrasting color.
In Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., the employer
included in its published standard operating procedures
(SOPs) a disclaimer stating that the procedures did not
constitute part of the contract of employment.
The
disclaimer was part of the general instructions of the
SOPs. Following the employee's termination, he commenced
a suit asserting that the SOPs created implied contract
rights. The district court posited at the outset that
a disclaimer must be conspicuous to be effective.
Examining the disclaimer in Jimenez, the court observed
that the disclaimer was not set off in such a way as to
attract attention to it. The court noted specifically
that "[n]othing [was] capitalized that would give notice
of a disclaimer. The type size equal [led] that of [any]
other provision on the same page. No border set[] the
disclaimer apart from any other paragraph on the page."
As a result, the court held that the disclaimer was not
conspicuous and, therefore, not effective, and granted
summary judgment that implied contract rights were
created by the SOPs.
Employers issuing multipage communications must not only
present their disclaimers in a conspicuous manner among
other statements on a page, but must also display their
disclaimers on a page which is prominent within the
communication as a whole.
Id. at 384-85 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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Opinions published since the above article continue to require
purported disclaimers of implied-in-fact employment contracts to
inform employees (1) clearly, and (2) conspicuously that policy
manuals are not part of the employee's contract of employment.
See, e.g., Jones, 779 P.2d at p. 788; Messerly v. Asamera Minerals,
(U.S.)

Inc..

55 Wash. App. 811, 780 P.2d 1327, 1330 (App. 1989).

In short, First Security's alleged "disclaimers" are ineffective
as a matter of law.
Moreover, even

if First

Security's

purported

disclaimer

appeared to create an effective disclaimer — which it does not —
contrary employer statements, including publishing disciplinary
procedures such as OP 6-5.2 that an employer must follow before
discharge, can negate the effect of an otherwise valid disclaimer.
See, Chagares, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. at 392.
As

noted

by

the

New Mexico

Supreme

Court, under

such

circumstances, a jury question still remains as to whether a
disclaimer indeed prevents the formation of a contract between an
employer and employee.

The district court accordingly should

receive evidence regarding conduct within the organization that
would indicate the disclaimer has been waived or abandoned by the
employer.

See, McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 110 N.M. 1, 791 P.2d

452, 459 (1990).

For example, an employer's policy of having its

supervisors follow applicable termination policies and procedures
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can negate an employer's claim that a disclaimer automatically
vitiates an implied-in-fact contract of employment.

See, id.

Here Sanderson claims he was given the Manual, told to follow
it, and did follow it, as did other supervisors. On such evidence,
a

jury may permissibly

ineffective

in

the

find the purported disclaimers to be

event

this

Court

declines

to

find

them

ineffective as a matter of law.
C.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That Sanderson

Could Not Recover For Emotional Distress As Foreseeable Consequential Damages Arising From First Security's Contractual Breach.
Consequential damages are a proper contract remedy if the losses
resulting from the breach were reasonably within the contemplation
of the parties when they entered into their contract. See, Berube,
771 P.2d at p. 1050.
This Court along with virtually all, if not all, courts in
the Anglo-American tradition cites the case of Hadlev v. Baxendale,
9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854) as the origin of this rule.
See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah
1985).

Similarly citing Hadley v. Baxendale, the United States

District Court for the Northern District of California recently
addressed this issue in Mosely v« Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 115
Lab. Cas. para. 56,221 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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In Mosely, the ex-employee sued his former employer for
wrongful termination, alleging it was foreseeable to the employer
that the employee would have difficulty finding suitable employment
and that this difficulty would cause him emotional distress.

The

employee contended that, due to his long tenure with the company
and numerous promotions, the foreseeability of emotional distress
caused by the termination of the employment contract must have been
reasonably contemplated by both parties.
The employer predictably argued that such recovery was an
improper contractual remedy; and the court directed both parties
to brief the issue of whether contract damages for emotional
distress are available in claims for breach of contract. After the
employee was unable to cite to any cases directly on point, the
court wrote as follows:
The issue thus reduces to whether the plaintiff's
emotional distress caused by termination was foreseeable
by both parties. This is an issue of fact which must be
resolved at trial after both parties present their
respective evidence. Therefore, the claim for emotional
distress damages is allowed to proceed as a substantive
matter.
• *•

Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for emotional distress
damages arising from defendant's alleged wrongful
termination of plaintiff is allowed to proceed and be
submitted for determination by the trier of fact.
Id. at pp. 79,022-23.
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In connection with Sanderson's illness, and at the same time
he was receiving assurances from Cummings that his own job would
be there for him upon his recovery, and while OP 6-5 • 2 was in
effect, Judd had a discussion with Garff, the social worker
affiliated with Sanderson's psychiatrist.

Garff told Judd that

Sanderson's emotional stability was fragile, and that Sanderson
would need approximately two weeks' absence from work so he could
get himself under control.

Judd himself recognized that whatever

First Security did might cause an adverse reaction in Sanderson.
Notwithstanding this knowledge and information, First Security
terminated Sanderson three days latar.

See Addendum "D".

The foreseeability of damages will always hinge upon the
nature and language of the contract and the reasonable expectations
of the parties. See, Berube, 771 P.2d at 1050. The reasonability
of a person's expectations involves an objective determination.
See, e.g., Matter of Gentry, 142 Mich. App. 701, 369 N.W.2d 889,
896 (App. 1985).

Questions of objective reasonability in wrongful

discharge cases such as this are for the jury.

See, e.g. Stark,

751 P.2d at p. 166.
Accordingly, Sanderson is entitled to have the jury determine
if the particular emotional distress and mental anguish he claims
to have suffered were foreseeable to First Security and, if so, the
extent of his damages.
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I),

The District Court Erred In Implicitly Concluding That

The Implied Covenant Of Cood Faith And Fair Dealing Does Not Exist
In An Employment Contract.

Although it is true that Utah has not

yet recognized a cause of action for violation of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts, see. Loose v.
Nature-All Corp,, 785 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Utah 1989), Utah appellate
courts have never rejected that cause of action.

In Berube, two

justices of this Court were prepared to recognize it. See, Berube,
771 P.2d

at 1046-50.

postponed

deciding

In his concurrence, Justice Zimmerman

the issue until a

"better opportunity to

consider the minimum rights and obligations that inhere in the
employment relationship."

Ld. at 1052. The position of Justices

Hall and Howe is still unstated.
In a more recent case, Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc.,
779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989), the plaintiff employee sued her former
employer for, among other things, breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing that attached to her employment
contract.

She alleged generally that the employer fired her in

order to avoid paying additional health insurance expenses.

See

id. at 669. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint,
and she appealed.

In reversing the trial court's dismissal, this

Court remanded all claims, including her claim that her employer
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breached the covenants of good faith and fair dealing.

See, id.

at 670.
Shortly after Judd was given the responsibility of managing
the Equipment Services Department during Sanderson's illness, Judd
began criticizing Sanderson's performance in written memos, none
of which was directed to Cummings, Sanderson's supervisor.

These

actions by Judd were consistent with Sanderson's belief that Judd
was "out to get" Sanderson. Judd's attacks on Sanderson increased
until Sanderson's termination. As pointed out in section C, supra,
Judd talked to one of the persons treating Sanderson three days
before Sanderson's dismissal.

During that conversation, Judd

learned that Sanderson's emotional stability was fragile and that
Sanderson needed approximately two weeks absence from work to get
himself under control.

Judd himself explicitly acknowledged that

any precipitous action by First Security might cause an adverse
reaction in Sanderson.
Based upon these undisputed facts, a triable issue of fact
exists as to whether First Security, through its agent, Judd, dealt
fairly and in good faith with Sanderson. A factual situation such
as this provides the "opportunity to consider the minimum rights
and obligations" First Security owed Sanderson, and whether First
Security breached those duties. This issue should, along with the
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other issues presented by this case, be remanded for trial before
a jury.
E.

The District Court Erred In Permitting First Security To

File Sanderson's Deposi ti on So 1 s To Become Par t Of The Record On
This Appeal.

Rule 4-502(4), Utah Code of Judicial Administration

reads:
Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the court
except as provided in Rule 4-501 of this Code or upon
order of the court for good cause shown.
(Emphasis added).
Rule 4-501(1)(a) provides, however, that a party may attach
deposition pages to legal memoranda as exhibits, a procedure
followed by Sanderson in this case, but not by First Security.
Accordingly, the only deposition pages considered by the district
court were those attached to Sanderson's memorandum (R. 161-198).
The justification First Security gave for its request to file
Sanderson's deposition, "to enable consideration thereof by an
appellate court" (R. 260), is directly contrary to controlling law
on this subject: Evidence not available to the trial judge cannot
be added to the record on appeal.

See, Territorial Sav. & Loan

Ass'n. v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah App. 1989).
In Baird, the parties made repeated references to a deposition
in their appellate briefs addressing the district court's grant of
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summary judgment to defendant. The appellant moved the Utah Court
of Appeals to supplement the record on appeal, claiming it had
inadvertently failed to include the deposition in the record filed
on appeal. The respondent replied that not only had the appellant
failed to file the deposition on appeal, but that appellant also
failed to file it with the trial court in connection with the
summary judgment motion, the same situation presented here.

In

denying the appellant's motion to supplement, the Utah Court of
Appeals wrote:
Thus, the trial court did not have John Baird's
deposition before it when it granted the trustee summary
judgment. Evidence not available to the trial judge
cannot be added to the record on appeal, and thus we deny
[appellant's] motion to supplement.
Accordingly, we
consider only facts properly before the trial court,
notwithstanding that both parties to this action
repeatedly cite to Baird's deposition in their appellate
briefs.
Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added).
In this case, the district court included in the record a
376-page document (R. 311) which it had never seen. This district
court's order permitting the filing of Sanderson's deposition is
legally improper, and should also be reversed.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The district court's Summary Judgment and Order should be
reversed.

The undisputed evidence before this Court demonstrates

that Sanderson was unjustifiably denied the benefits of OP 6-5.2
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when First Security terminated him for alleged
performance".

"unsatisfactory

As in Titan Services, this Court should direct the

district court to enter judgment against First Security as to
liability,

and

to

conduct

a trial

solely

on

the

issue of

Sanderson's damages.
At the least, however, in its order of reversal, this Court
should direct the district court to conduct a trial on all of
Sanderson's claims, including his contractually based claim for
emotional distress and his claim that First Security breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its termination
of Sanderson.
DATED:

November

/&

, 1990.

ANDERSON & WATKINS

&UMt. '*U$Z
Thomas R. KarrCTbgjg^/
Bruce Wycoff (_J
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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day of November,

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
\

RUSSELL W, SANDERSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

1
;

FIRST SECURITY LEASING COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

\i

Case H-

900254

vs»

Defendant/Appellee.
ADDENDA

Priority 16

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR-6
SALT LAKE COUNTY

Cje>t^zi>^A^w

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RUSSELL W. SANDERSON,

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 890905900CN

vs.
FIRST SECURITY LEASING COMPANY,
a Utah corporation
Defendant.

The Court having considered the Motion for an Order to
File the Plaintiff's Deposition filed on behalf of the defendant
and the Memorandum in Opposition and in Support thereof and being
fully advised in the premises now makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The Order heretofore signed will be allowed to stand.
The Court is of the opinion that the evidence upon which, inter
alia, the Summary Judgment was granted was as attached to the
pleadings of the plaintiff.

In order for those matters to be

considered by the Court on Appeal the deposition in it's whole
must be filed but the Court will consider, I am sure, only that

SANDERSON V FIRST SECURITY

PAGE 2

MEMO DECISION

portion which was cited by the parties.

Thus the undersigned can

see no mischief in putting the whole of the deposition in even
though only limited portions were used for the purpose of the
Motion for Summary Judgment, no order need be filed hereon.
DATED this

It

day of April, 1990.

F51I3SHST&SST«0U&T
Third JudicW District

APR 1 1 1990
Bv/

*K.fittt

rw

JANET HUGIE SMITH (A522 9)
RICK L. ROSE (A5140) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OoOoo
RUSSELL W. SANDERSON,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
FIRST SECURITY LEASING COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 890905900CN

Defendant.

Judge Richard H. Moffat
ooOoo

Defendant First Security Leasing Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the Court on March 23,
1990, with Janet Hugie Smith appearing on behalf of defendant and
Thomas R. Karrenberg and Bruce Wycoff appearing on behalf of
plaintiff, Russell W. Sanderson.

The Court having reviewed the

pleadings, motion papers, legal memoranda and deposition cited
therein submitted by counsel, and having heard the oral arguments,
and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint and all claims
for relief and causes of action contained therein are dismissed
with prejudice on the basis that plaintiff Sanderson's employment
relationship with First Security Leasing Company was at-will and
could be terminated by either party at any time, with or without
cause.

Further, Sanderson is not entitled to recover damages for

mental and emotional distress under his employment contract claim.
Summary judgment shall be entered in accordance with this
*

order.

Approved as to form:

Thomas R. Karrenberg
Bruce Wycoff
ANDERSON Sc WATKINS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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RRST SECURITY BANKS

OPERATING

PROCEDURES

1
T
l&AT!

'

SUBJECT:
OP 6 - Employee Relations
5 - Employee Relations and Terminations
.2 - Managing for Improvement Procedure

NOV 1

1S32 '

POLICY
1.
F i r s t Security follows the Managing for Improvement Procedure as a
guideline for d i s c i p l i n a r y action taken by management for all Fir^z Security
Employees ( o f f i c e r / n o n - o f f i c e r ) .
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY THE MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE
Z.
7ne Managing for Improvement Procedure i s used to deal with :*o d i s t i n c t
types of d i s c i p l i n a r y proolems.
(a)

Job P^rfomancs:

(b)

Policy Violation:

Repeated f a i l u r e to meet performance standards.

(1)

Repeated violation of F i r s t Security work r u l e s / p o l i c y .

(2)

A s i n g l e , serious v i o l a t i o n of work r u l e s / p o l i c y .

GCCWEHTIWG THE MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE
3.
Documentation 1s d e s c r i b e d in d e t a i l
Ccnwunication S e r i e s , Employment P r a c t i c e s .

in Volume V of the Personnel

(a)

Documentation a t the informal stage i s not retained in the Employee
Personnel F i l e .

(b)

(Documentation at the formal stage i s retained in the Employee
Personnel F i l e .

MANAGING FOtt IMPRQVEMEHT PROCEDURE
4.

(a)

Informal Stage * The informal stage i s used to address i n i t i a l
performance/policy violation problems.

jcb

(1)

O i s c u s s the s i t u a t i o n with t h e employee.
Listen to the
employee and work together to determine causes for apparent
problems.

(2)

If a job performance problem exists, determine if the emoloyee
has had sufficient training.

EXHIWT
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2

OP 6-5,
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NOV 1 9
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MA WAGING FOR IMPffOVSMSMT PROCEDURE (CQMT)

(b)

(2)

I f a policy violation has occurred, determine i f the employee
understands work rules/policy.

(4)

Oiscuss appropriate behavior with the employee.
Make sure
that the employee understands what is expected and tna
conseouences for repeated violation.

Foraal Stage - The formal stage is used to rectify job
perrormance/policy violation problems which have not been resolved
at the informal stace. Use of the formal stage is also appropriate
i f the employee f a i l s into a pattern of repeated violation after
showing a short term chance in behavior as a result of involvement
in tne informal stage.
(i)

(2)

Job Performance Problems:
(A)

When informal action is ineffective, prepare a plan for
improvement with the employee. Describe the behavioral
change reouired, rime frsm^ allotted for improvement, and
consecuences requiring frcm failure to improve, which may
include prooaticn, suspension, or salary review.

(B)

I f the employee does not imorove performance within the
allotted time frame, place the employee on probation for
a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days.

(C)

I f the employee does not improve performance during the
probationary period, terminate the employee in accordance
with bank/subsidiary policy.

Policy Violation Problems:
(A)

Prepart a written warning for the employee when informal
discussion of a policy violation has been ineffective.
Includt i record of events, behavior that violated the
work rule/policy, and the consecuences resulting from
repeated violation.

(8)

I f violations continue after a written warning, suspend
the cnployee for a period of one to three days without
pay.

(C)

I f violations occur after the suspension, terminate the
employee.

5.
Suspensions/terminations resulting from tins
approved by the Qfvfsfon/Sudsfdfary Head Off fee.

procedure

are

to

be

5.
In sftuatfens where employee behavfor warrants fmrne^ fa re ten&fnatfon me
stages of tin's process do not need to be followed.
Termination in these
cases must be approved by the appropriate 01visi on/Subsidiary Head Offfee.
CCMPSHSATIOH GarDgLIMES
7.
Employees fnvolved fn the fomal stage of the procedure are not
for job announcements (where applicable),'and salary increases.
eHgfbi e
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M E M O R A N D U M
TO:

Personnel File

FROM:

Gary Judd

DATE:

May 15, 1989

SUBJECT:

Russ Sanderson

On Friday, May 12, 1989, I was finally able to contact Rob Garff,
social worker for Mr. Sanderson and evidently a psychologist, to
discuss his health. He reported Russ was suffering from stress
and emotional upset as a result of a divorce and his job and the
change in supervisor, as well as other changes in Equipment
Services. Therefore, he did in fact, recommend Mr. Sanderson
seek a leave of absence for at least two weeks. He would not
elaborate and would not explain any details as to the treatment
Mr. Sanderson is receiving, and his conclusions. He evidently is
receiving council from both Mr. Garff, as well as his
psychiatrist.

GBJ/j

~ftfi*^C>'

Telephone Conversation - May 12, 1989 - Rob Garff/Gary Judd
J:

Mr. Garff

G:

Yes

J:

This is Gary Judd of First Security Leasing

G:

Yes

J:

I'm Russ Sandersons1 supervisor

G:

Right

J:

I just called that we might better understand what his
situation is.

G:

OK

J:

He has been gone a great deal and says he won't be back for
perhaps another month, so I though I'd better give you a
call and try to

G:

Uh, I kind of feel like he needs a leave of absence for
awhile just to give himself a chance to get on his feet a
little better and to decide where he is going with all of
this.

J:

Uh,

G:

The divorce, the work, the changes there, how it's affecting
him, because he is apparently feeling some real pressure
from up there.

J:

Uh-huh, so is that creating the problem, the stress, that
he's

G:

well, I think that is a good part of it right at this
present time

J:

Uh-huh, what is your feeling about it?
situation?

G:

Ok, in relation, uh how do you mean, what are you asking?

J:

Well, I'm just asking of his well-being, frankly, how he is,
we are a little concerned, about him. We are concerned that.
whatever we do might cause an adverse reaction, so we are a
little concerned about him

G:

Well, and I think he is as well, and I am, as far as that's
concerned too. I know that there, from what he's been
telling me, that there are some changes taking place up
there and, changes in supervision, changes that way, and I

I'm not sure what, is it the divorce, or his work, or

How sensitive is his

1000:9

oc

think piling those all right now, along with the other
things that he's been going through, ya, are causing some
adverse reaction to him and I think he, you know, he needs a
little time to get, to get himself under control.
OK, well, I guess I'm not exactly certain what we, what to
do. We can just
Does he have the time that he can have the leave of absence?
Well, frankly, he pretty much used up all the time, but,
he's been off a great deal during the past six months, or
even longer since his divorce. I guess it was mid-summer, so
that's one concern, that's not the main concern. We just
have a business to run and he's the manager of a certain
department, and he just hasn't been here.
Uh-huh
So we've got to make some changes, we can't operate this
way. That's been explained to him and I don't think the
change in supervisor has anything to do with it because his
performance prior to that was not adequate and not
responsive, so I think that's created some of his problem
That came about as far as from, you know, from the divorce
Could have, yes
That is becoming more resolved.
Ok, so
I probably will not see him until next week now, and perhaps
I can talk with him a little bit about it and see where
we're going again next week, and then maybe we can get back
together.
But it is your recommendation that he stays away from work,
is that correct?
That's my recommendation that he have a leave of absence.
How long, Mr. Garff?
Right now I'm not sure that I could give you an adequate, I
would think at least a couple of weeks.
Ok, I appreciate that.
Ok,
Thank you very much.
You bet
Good bye
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career development, feel Uvc to discuss it with your supervisor or appropriate manager. If you are qualified tor an
opening, you may be considered for advancement.

Employment Duration

S

ON THE JOB
Working Status

E

Dress Policy

mployment with First Security is "at will" employment
and is, therefore, not for any rixvx\ period of time. Your
employment with First Security is at the will and discretion
of First Security and may be terminated at any time by First
Security or by you :LS an employee.

mployees are classified as full-time, part-time, or temporary. Full and part-time e m p l o y m e n t means that you
are scheduled to w o r k a certain n u m b e r of hours each work
week, subject to the c o m p a n y ' s discretion. Temporary
employment is for a specified period or in a job o n an intermittent basis T h e extent of participation in the First Security
benefits program is based o n your employment status.
In addition, the federal Fair l-abor Standard Act classifies
employees into two general categories based on requirements
for m i n i m u m wages a n d overtime compensation:
a. "Exempt" includes executives, professional,
administrative employees a n d certain sales representatives as defined by the U.S. Department of l-ibor.
b. "Nonexempt" includes all other employees.
If you are considered a nonexempt employee, you are
covered under the provisions of the Act and are eligible for
overtime pay w h e n applicable.

Working Hours

T

he n u m b e r of h o u r s worked, start, a n d completion times
differ t h r o u g h o u t the organization. Your supervisor will
explain the working h o u r s in your office. First Security's
standard work week is from 12.01 a.m. Sunday to midnight
Saturday

Report of Hours Worked

o

Lunch/Break Periods
ince First Security is open continuously during the working day, lunch and break periods are scheduled o n a staggered basis in m o s t offices. T h e length of the scheduled
lunch period varies throughout the organization to suit the
needs of the office Lunch periods, however, may not be less
than 30 minutes. Morning and afternoon break periods of 15
minutes each are provided. The lunch period is not time
worked, but the break periods are included as work time.
Your supervisor will explain the scheduling of lunch and
break periods for y o u r department or office.

E

Q

to y o u r supervisor at the cnc\ of each pay period.

onexempt employees are responsible for recording on a
time sheet tl h o u i s woiked each day Flea.se reeoul
\ u u i time \\\ ,iml out to the nearest live minutes Time

N

F

irst Security's dress and grooming policy is a business
standard that avoids extremes in fashions and hairstyles.
We have responded to changes in fashion, modifying the
accepteel standards of appropriate I
^ss dress to include
m o r e variety in r cQ.lors, styles, .textures and lines, and we will
continue to do so. T h e financial services industry has
historically expected employees to dress conservatively and
moderately, a n d this philosophy stili applies. Your supervisor
or the H u m a n Resources Division will be happy to answer
any questions you might have regarding appropriate dress
a n d g r o o m i n g standards. Inappropriate dress will result in
counseling by y o u r supervising officer or manager.

Personal Data

B

e sure that y o u r personnel records are correct and u p to
date. Please notify your local personnel officer of any
changes in y o u r marital status, n u m b e r of dependents, home
address or telephone number. If you have furthered y o u r
education or received any special h o n o r s or recognitions,
we'd like to know.
Changes in dependent medical insurance coverage must
be reported within 30 days to the Benefits Department.

Personal Telephone Calls/Mail
^ irst Security's teleph •• system plays an important part
. in the conduct of daily business. While you may make <
receive essential local personal calls, habitual use of the

1
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Conflict of Interest
Business Ventures
Investments
Margin Accounts
Repossessions
Retired or Obsolete Company Property
Confidential Information
Borrowing from C u s t o m e r s and Employees
Account Relationships
Lending to Relatives
Use of First Security Letterhead'

GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY

20
20
21
21
21
22
22
22
23
23

First Security's reputation for honesty, integrity, and safety is the
sum o\ the personal reputations of its employees. First Security
d e p e n d s upon the talents and efforts of its employees for its
excellent performance.

Trust Group Rules

24

Outside Employment

26

Insurance, Real Estate investments,
O t h e r Employment
Officership, Directorship or Partnership
of Outside Concerns
Church, Charitable, Fraternal or Civic
Activities
Fees
Fiduciary Appointments
Employment in Securities Business
Contributions
Political Contributions
Civic, Religious, Charitable Contributions
Employee Contributions
Employee Responsibilities

^
A
(^

20

26
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27
27
28
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30
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30
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Use of Microcomputers

32

Equal Employment O p p o r t u n i t y Statement

33

A Summary of Offenses Under Federal Banking Laws
Employee Compliance with Standards

34
35

Statement of Compliance
Exceptions to Standards
Pre-Existing Violations of Standards
Employee Appeal Process . ,

35
35
35
36

First Security Standards for Employee Conduct is intended to govern
your actions and working relationships with customers, fellow
employees, competitors, government representatives,
communications media, or any one else by w h o m you may be
identified as an employee of First Security. Furthermore, what you
are prohibited from doing u n d e r these standards shall not be done,
or knowingly permitted to be done indirectly, through relatives,
friends, or otherwise.
There may be occasions w h e n First Security must change rules
or give current rules a different interpretation than previously
made. First Security has the right to modify policies, both written
and unwritten. The language used in these standards is not
intended to create, nor is it to be construed as, a contract between
First Security and any or all of its employees.
Employment with First Security is "at will" employment and is,
therefore, not for any fixed period of time. Your employment with
First Security is at the will and discretion of First Security and may
be ended at any time by First Security or by you as an employe
The terms "First Security" and "Company", as used in these
standards, mean First Security Corporation and each of its
subsidiary companies. The term "employees" includes all full and
part-time employees of First Security Corporation and each of
subsidiary companies. The term "senior management" denotes tl
position of senior vice president or higher.
In many situations involving ethical or moral judgments, it ma;
be difficult to determine the correct course of action. In such
instances, you are not required to rely solely on your own judgiru
but are encouraged to discuss the matter in full with your
supervisor. Full disclosure of the facts in timely fashion to pre
authority, with resulting approval, will always serve to meet you
responsibilities with respect to these standards.
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